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ADMISSION OF WRONGDOING:  
INCREASING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
SEC SETTLEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, Mary Jo White, Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC or Commission), announced a new SEC settlement 
policy: in certain cases, the SEC would seek an admission of wrongdoing 
from parties before agreeing to settle.1 The new policy marked a sea change 
in established SEC settlement practice. Previously, parties had routinely 
been permitted to “neither admit nor deny” wrongdoing in their settlement.2 
The justification for the previous policy was the idea that parties would 
rather litigate than admit to wrongdoing, out of fear that an admission 
would subject them to collateral estoppel in related suits. 3  Chair White 
believes that this justification for “neither admit nor deny” language does 
not always hold true, especially in particularly egregious cases. 4  She 
believes that the need for public accountability is great enough that parties 
in these cases must make an admission of wrongdoing as part of their 
settlement.5 
Reaction to the new policy has been mixed. Some critics laud the move 
as an important step for the Commission in holding settling parties more 
accountable.6 Others have questioned the policy, echoing the argument that 
attempts to extract admissions disincentivize parties from settling.7  
Criticism of the Commission’s new policy is misplaced on two 
grounds. First, the SEC’s goal in requiring admissions in certain cases is not 
to increase settling parties’ collateral liability. In fact, so far the SEC has 
allowed parties to structure their admissions in such a way that they 
preclude further collateral liability. This makes sense, given the 
Commission’s stated purpose in adopting this policy change. Chair White 
has stated that the SEC revised its settlement practices to increase settling 
parties’ accountability to the public by establishing “an unambiguous record 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. James B. Stewart, The S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-
chief-promises-tougher-line-on-cases.html. 
 2. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 77 (2012) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, 
Division of Enforcement, SEC) [hereinafter Hearings], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75734/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg75734.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 79.  
 4. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors: Deploying 
the Full Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech 
/Detail/Speech/1370539841202. 
 5. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Marc Fagel, The SEC’s Troubling New Policy Requiring Admissions, 45 BNA SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. 1172 (2013), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Fagel-
SECs-Troubling-New-Policy-Requiring-Admissions.pdf. 
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of the conduct” at issue.8 In short, the SEC is not seeking an increase in 
collateral liability for parties by requiring an admission from them. Second, 
for a variety of reasons, admissions made in SEC consent judgments are not 
by themselves likely to increase the collateral liability of settling parties. 
This Note examines the ramifications of an admission of wrongdoing in 
an SEC settlement. Part I provides the factual background surrounding the 
new policy, including recent cases in which the new admissions policy has 
been applied. Part II examines criticisms of the Commission’s new policy 
and identifies a number of limitations on collateral liability resulting from 
settlement admissions. Part III analyzes admissions the SEC has so far 
extracted and the manner in which these admissions have been structured to 
limit the admitting party’s collateral liability. 
I. HISTORY OF SEC SETTLEMENT PRACTICE  
A. “NEITHER ADMIT NOR DENY” IN SEC SETTLEMENTS  
The SEC has a variety of enforcement powers at its disposal. The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) provides that as part 
of its mandate to enforce the federal securities laws, the SEC may file a 
civil enforcement action in federal district court.9 The SEC may also seek to 
file an administrative complaint before one of its administrative law 
judges.10 Regardless of the chosen means of enforcement in a given case, 
the vast majority of the actions that the Commission initiates end in 
settlement.11 The Commission often makes use of consent decrees when 
negotiating a settlement.12 Over ninety percent of the suits initiated by the 
SEC are settled in this manner.13 
Consent decrees are “negotiated settlements [between the parties] 
submitted to a court for approval and entry of a judgment.” 14 
Unsurprisingly, such an agreement “normally embodies a compromise” 
between the Commission and the defending party.15 In the past, as part of 
that compromise, settling parties have neither admitted nor denied the 
underlying factual allegations in the consent decree. 16  In practice, such 
                                                                                                                                       
 8. White, supra note 4.  
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). 
 10. Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (last modified 
Mar. 4, 2014). 
 11. SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 12. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 77. The Code of Federal Regulations expressly 
contemplates the use of consent decrees by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (2014) (“In the course 
of the Commission’s investigations, civil lawsuits, and administrative proceedings, the staff, with 
appropriate authorization, may discuss with persons involved the disposition of such matters by 
consent, by settlement, or in some other manner.”). 
 13. Clifton, 700 F.2d at 748.  
 14. Hearings, supra note 2, at 76 n.4.  
 15. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). 
 16. Hearings, supra note 2, at 77.  
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language bars the settling party from denying the factual allegations but 
does not require the defendant to admit to the alleged wrongdoing.17 The 
justification for this “neither admit nor deny” policy is that it provides 
greater incentive for parties to settle.18 Courts, recognizing the virtues of 
negotiated settlements, 19  have generally been deferential in approving 
consent decrees with “neither admit nor deny” language.20 
In 2012, then-acting SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert 
Khuzami testified before Congress and spoke at length about the 
Commission’s settlement practices.21 He specifically addressed the SEC’s 
inclusion of “neither admit nor deny” language in consent decrees. 22 
Khuzami stated that there would be “far fewer settlements, and much 
greater delay in resolving matters and bringing relief to harmed investors,” 
if the SEC had to extract admissions from defendants. 23  Khuzami 
maintained requiring an admission would handicap the SEC's ability to 
settle because such admissions may expose a corporation to additional 
liability in private suits. 24 Corporate defense attorneys have echoed this 
concern.25 
Despite their prevalence, the Commission does not include “neither 
admit nor deny” language in all of its settlements.26 The SEC has carved out 
an important exception to its “neither admit nor deny” policy in cases with 
pending parallel criminal proceedings.27 Upon a self-directed review of its 
settlement policies in 2012, the Commission determined that the inclusion 
of “neither admit nor deny” language in such cases makes little sense.28 
Specifically, the SEC found it “unnecessary for there to be a ‘neither admit’ 
provision in those cases where a defendant had been criminally convicted of 
conduct that formed the basis of a parallel civil enforcement proceeding.”29 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF “NEITHER ADMIT NOR DENY” CONSENT 
DECREES 
Despite the purported benefits of the SEC’s prior settlement practices, 
the Commission’s use of “neither admit nor deny” language has come under 
                                                                                                                                       
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 79.  
 19. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 760 n.15 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 20. Hearings, supra note 2, at 77.  
 21. Id. at 74.  
 22. Id. at 77.  
 23. Id. at 79.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 26. Hearings, supra note 2, at 82.  
 27. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Public Statement: Recent Policy Change 
(Jan. 7, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt 
/1365171489600. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
2014] Increasing Public Accountability in SEC Settlements  541 
fire in the aftermath of the financial crisis. One of the more notable critics 
of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” policy is Judge Jed S. Rakoff, a 
federal district court judge sitting in New York’s Southern District.30 In two 
high-profile cases, Judge Rakoff rejected consent judgments proposed by 
the SEC because they included “neither admit nor deny” language.31 
In 2009, the SEC filed a complaint in district court against Bank of 
America, alleging that the bank materially misled its shareholders in its deal 
to acquire Merrill Lynch.32 The same day, the SEC filed a consent judgment 
that Bank of America had already stipulated to in order to settle the case.33 
Judge Rakoff applied the customary deferential standard in reviewing the 
consent judgment.34 Specifically, he wrote that “the Court is . . . obliged to 
review the proposal . . . to ascertain whether it is within the bounds of 
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy—and, in certain circumstances, 
whether it serves the public interest.” 35  Judge Rakoff ruled that the 
proposed settlement with Bank of America failed to meet even this 
deferential standard and rejected the consent decree.36 
 Similarly, in 2011, Judge Rakoff refused to approve a $285 million 
settlement between the SEC and Citigroup because it contained “neither 
admit nor deny” language. 37  The SEC alleged that in 2007, Citigroup 
recognized that mortgage-backed securities were beginning to weaken, 
dumped them on uninformed investors, and made significant profits off of 
these transactions while investors suffered large losses.38 
An agreed-to consent judgment was simultaneously filed with the 
complaint, subject only to approval by the court.39 In keeping with prior 
SEC practice, the consent judgment contained “neither admit nor deny” 
language.40 Judge Rakoff refused to approve the consent judgment because 
of the seriousness of the allegations contained within the SEC’s complaint 
and in supplementary documents.41 The “neither admit nor deny” language 
in the consent decree deprived “the Court . . . [of] proven or admitted facts 
                                                                                                                                       
 30. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1. 
 31. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Bank 
of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed 
by History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff’s Critique of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 51 (2012). 
 32. Bank of Am., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. (citing SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984)).  
 36. Id.  
 37. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also 
Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-accord-with-
citi.html. 
 38. Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329.  
 39. Id. at 330.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
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upon which to exercise even a modest degree of independent judgment.”42 
Without such facts, the district court held that it could not determine the 
propriety of the consent decree and therefore rejected it.43 
In the aftermath of Judge Rakoff’s ruling, both the SEC and Citigroup 
pursued interlocutory appeals of the rejection of the consent decree.44 The 
Second Circuit stated that the district court had overstepped its bounds in 
rejecting the consent judgment, declaring that “it is not the proper function 
of federal courts to dictate to executive administrative agencies what 
policies will best serve the public interest.”45 The Second Circuit stayed 
further district court proceedings pending a full appeal of the district court 
ruling.46 
C. RECENT CHANGES IN SEC SETTLEMENT POLICY  
Recently, the Commission changed its stance on admissions in 
settlements.47 Soon after being approved as the new Chair of the SEC, Mary 
Jo White announced a new policy where the Commission would in certain 
cases seek an admission of wrongdoing from settling parties. 48  In 
announcing the new policy, Chair White emphasized that the majority of 
cases could still be settled by a party without an admission of wrongdoing.49 
In a recent speech, Chair White described the types of future cases in 
which the Commission would seek an admission of wrongdoing. 50 
Specifically, she referenced cases where 
a large number of investors have been harmed or the conduct was 
otherwise egregious . . . , cases where the conduct posed a significant risk 
to the market or investors . . . , cases where admissions would aid 
investors deciding whether to deal with a particular party in the future . . . , 
[and] cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an important 
message to the market about a particular case.51 
Rather than strict criteria for seeking an admission, these listed factors are 
to be considered within the context of an individual case in order to 
determine whether an admission is warranted.52 
Chair White’s concern in articulating this new policy is with increasing 
settling parties’ accountability to the public.53 An admission of wrongdoing 
                                                                                                                                       
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 45. Id. at 164–65 n.3.  
 46. Id. at 169.  
 47. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. White, supra note 4.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 53. White, supra note 4.  
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increases accountability because it “creates an unambiguous record of the 
conduct and demonstrates unequivocally the defendant’s responsibility for 
his or her acts.” 54 Chair White emphasized her experience as a federal 
prosecutor when announcing the new policy. 55  In reviewing the 
Commission’s settlement policies, Chair White analogized an admission to 
the powerful effect of a guilty plea in establishing an unambiguous factual 
record of the conduct at issue.56 She believes that some SEC enforcement 
actions require just such an unambiguous factual record for the sake of 
transparency.57 
The emphasis upon accountability that underlies the Commission’s new 
policy dovetails with the SEC’s stated enforcement goals. 58  In a recent 
speech, Chair White emphasized her belief in the importance of the public 
nature of the SEC’s enforcement actions, both to parties within the financial 
markets and without.59 She believes the SEC needs “to have a presence 
everywhere and be perceived to be everywhere bringing enforcement 
actions against violators in every market participant category and in every 
market strata.” 60  The new admissions policy furthers this important 
institutional goal because it creates a clear factual record that the public can 
rely on.61 
D. REACTIONS TO THE NEW SEC ADMISSIONS POLICY 
Reaction to the SEC’s new policy has been mixed. Professor John 
Coffee of Columbia University, a historically vocal critic of what he has 
called overly lenient SEC settlements, thinks that requiring admissions in 
some cases is “an important step in the right direction.”62 Professor Coffee 
asserts that the new policy is an important acknowledgement of the 
increasing public demand for accountability in financial enforcement 
actions, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis.63 His comments 
echo Chair White’s emphasis on the importance of an unambiguous record 
that details what conduct actually took place.64 
Corporate defense attorneys are decidedly less optimistic than Professor 
Coffee about the new policy. Brad Karp, a litigator for Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP who represented Citigroup in its SEC 
                                                                                                                                       
 54. Id.  
 55. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. White, supra note 4.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 63. Id.  
 64. White, supra note 4.  
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filing, has expressed serious concerns about the new admissions policy.65 
The biggest concern articulated by Mr. Karp, and echoed by others,66 is that 
the new policy may incentivize litigation because an admission in a consent 
judgment may expose a financial institution to collateral liability.67 As a 
result, it may be in the best interests of these parties to go to trial rather than 
to settle and admit to any wrongdoing.68 In sum, defense counsel’s concern 
is that the SEC’s new policy will increase expensive, contested litigation 
with well-funded and highly motivated opposing parties.69 Such litigation 
may take years before any trial verdict is obtained.70 
Defense counsel raise further concerns about the SEC’s institutional 
capability to engage in this type of protracted litigation. This increase in 
litigation may consume so much of the Commission’s limited resources that 
it may have a trickle-down effect, actually making the SEC less effective at 
regulating the securities markets.71 Because the SEC will have to devote 
more resources to protracted litigation involving parties unwilling to make 
an admission, they argue, the Commission’s ability to effectively monitor 
and prevent future securities fraud and other types of misconduct will be 
compromised. 72 As mentioned, the protracted and complicated nature of 
this sort of litigation means that these trials could take years. 73  These 
concerns rest on the presumption that the SEC’s new policy will necessarily 
result in more litigation. 
E. ADMISSIONS MADE UNDER THE NEW POLICY 
The SEC extracted its first admission of wrongdoing on August 19, 
2013, in its settlement with Phillip Falcone, manager of Harbinger Capital 
Partners.74 Mr. Falcone admitted to improper use of fund assets and other 
acts of misconduct towards investors. 75  This settlement agreement was 
preceded by an earlier offer from the SEC’s Enforcement Division that did 
not require Mr. Falcone to admit any wrongdoing, but that offer was later 
                                                                                                                                       
 65. Stewart, supra note 1, at B1.  
 66. Thomas A. Zaccaro et al., SEC’s Guilt Admission Policy May Bring Pricey Trials, L. 360 
(July 3, 2013, 1:40 PM), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/the-way-
we-work---publications/secs-guilt-admission-policy-may-bring-pricey-trials.pdf. 
 67. Fagel, supra note 7, at 1172.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Press Release, SEC, Phillip Falcone and Harbinger Capital Agree to Settlement (Aug. 19, 
2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539780222#.UkRxdIasgk0. 
 75. Id.  
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withdrawn by the Commission for being too lenient. 76  Mr. Falcone’s 
admission set an important first precedent for the SEC, especially in 
relation to more high-profile cases like the JPMorgan “London Whale” 
trading disaster.77 
The SEC’s hope to pressure JPMorgan into providing an admission in 
the London Whale case ultimately came to fruition when the Commission 
reached a $920 million settlement with the financial services provider.78 
The settlement also included an admission of wrongdoing by the bank for 
failing to catch traders hiding losses. 79  JPMorgan’s admission of 
wrongdoing was an important prerequisite for SEC approval of the 
settlement.80 
The wording of JPMorgan’s admission is important because it limits 
further collateral liability on the part of the bank. 81  In its settlement, 
JPMorgan admitted to having inadequate internal risk controls in place, not 
to committing any sort of fraudulent activity.82 Such an admission limits 
JPMorgan’s liability significantly because it does not expose the bank to 
liability in a shareholder class action for fraud. 83  Such a suit typically 
requires proof of an intentional fraud, and JPMorgan’s admission has no 
bearing on that issue.84 
Some have criticized the SEC for the limited nature of JPMorgan’s 
admission. Adam Pritchard, a University of Michigan law professor, 
characterized the settlement as a “show of an admission” without any real 
consequences.85 Regardless of the actual effect of JPMorgan’s admission, it 
creates an uncontroverted and unambiguous factual record of the London 
Whale trades. This settlement remains one of the most high-profile 
implementations of the Commission’s new policy to date.  
                                                                                                                                       
 76. Alexandra Stevenson, Falcone to Admit to Wrongdoing as S.E.C. Takes a Harder Line, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/19 
/hedge-fund-manager-to-admit-to-wrongdoing-in-revised-deal-with-s-e-c/. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Joshua Gallu, JPMorgan Guilty Admission a Win for SEC’s Policy Shift, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 20, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/jpmorgan-s-guilty-
admission-marks-victory-in-sec-s-policy-shift.html; see also Press Release, SEC, JPMorgan 
Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965 
#.UzyzbfldWSp. 
 79. Press Release, SEC, JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits 
Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965#.UzyzbfldWSp. 
 80. Gallu, supra note 78.  
 81. Id.  
 82. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, Accounting and Auditing 
Release No. 3490, 2013 WL 5275772, annex A at 4 (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter JPMorgan 
Consent Decree], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf.  
 83. Gallu, supra note 78.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
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 II. CRITICISM OF THE NEW ADMISSIONS POLICY 
The SEC's new admissions policy has been criticized for 
disincentivizing parties from settling with the Commission. This critique 
rests on the idea that an admission of wrongdoing will increase a settling 
party's collateral liability. Specifically, critics predict an increase in 
collateral liability in shareholder class actions based on the same underlying 
facts as the SEC enforcement action and an increase in Directors' and 
Officers' Liability Insurance costs. Instead of admitting to wrongdoing and 
incurring these additional liabilities, parties to SEC enforcement actions 
will instead choose to fully litigate the dispute at trial. This concern with the 
extension of liabilities and costs, however, is ameliorated by the special 
nature of consent judgments—the SEC's preferred means of settlement. 
A. INCREASE IN COLLATERAL LIABILITY FOR ADMITTING PARTIES 
Commentators critical of the new SEC settlement policy have argued 
that an admission of wrongdoing unacceptably extends settling parties’ 
collateral liability in subsequent class actions arising out of the same set of 
facts. Professor Coffee nicely summarizes these concerns.86 First, critics of 
the new policy argue that an admission may serve as a form of offensive 
collateral estoppel barring the settling party from contesting the admitted to 
issue in future suits.87 Second, critics think that even if settling parties are 
not collaterally estopped from contesting the admitted-to issue, the 
admission itself would not be excludable evidence in a future jury trial.88 
Collateral estoppel is a doctrine that limits a party “from relitigating 
facts resolved adversely to them in a prior equitable proceeding with 
another party.”89 Offensive collateral estoppel refers to the use of collateral 
estoppel by a plaintiff “seeking to estop a defendant from relitigating the 
issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another 
plaintiff.”90 Critics of the new policy are concerned that future class-action 
plaintiffs may use an SEC settlement admission to collaterally estop an 
admitting party from contesting the admitted-to issue.91 
The offensive collateral estoppel concern with the SEC’s new 
admissions policy rests in large part on the holding in Parklane Hosiery v. 
Shore.92 In that case, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in a proxy fraud 
class action properly invoked offensive collateral estoppel on issues that 
                                                                                                                                       
 86. John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Neither Admit Nor Deny’: Practical Implications of SEC’s New 
Policy, N.Y.L.J., July 18, 2013, at 5. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1978). 
 90. Id. at 329. 
 91. Coffee, supra note 86, at 5.  
 92. Id.  
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had already been adjudicated in an earlier SEC trial. 93  Given that the 
“petitioners received a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate their issues” in 
the preceding SEC action, the Court held that offensive collateral estoppel 
applied in this case. 94  The Court cabined its decision by giving broad 
discretion to the district court in determining whether offensive collateral 
estoppel is appropriate in a given case.95 The appropriate inquiry for the 
exercise of this discretion is whether collateral estoppel of an issue is 
appropriate or “would be unfair to a defendant.”96 
In the aftermath of Parklane, it is apparent that in some instances a 
party may be collaterally estopped from contesting certain issues it has 
already litigated in future securities class actions. An admission in an SEC 
settlement, however, would not warrant the application of offensive 
collateral estoppel.97 The key factor for the Court in Parklane was the “full 
and fair” opportunity that the previous SEC trial had afforded the 
petitioners in fully litigating the contested issue. 98  An admission in a 
consent judgment does not present the same opportunity for a party to 
contest a factual issue because of the negotiated nature of the judgment. 
Consent decrees, the SEC’s preferred method of settlement, 99  are 
unique in many ways. One such aspect of consent decrees is that they do 
not constitute an adjudication of factual claims.100 In one case, in which the 
relevant consent decree purported to be “an admission of fault,” the 
Supreme Court stated in dicta that consent decrees do “not . . . adjudicate” 
the underlying claims at issue. 101  This view is consistent with the 
Restatement of Judgments, which provides that the “central characteristic of 
a consent judgment is that the court has not actually resolved the substance 
of the issues presented.”102 
Because a consent decree is non-adjudicatory by nature, an admission 
therein does not amount to the “full” and “fair” opportunity to litigate that 
Parklane requires.103 Since a consent judgment does not present such an 
opportunity, any admission made within such a judgment could not be used 
to collaterally estop a party from contesting a claim under Parklane.104 In 
                                                                                                                                       
 93. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 333. 
 94. Id. at 332. 
 95. Id. at 331. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Coffee, supra note 86, at 5.  
 98. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332. 
 99. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 77.  
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 101. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 126 n.8 (1980). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27. 
 103. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332. 
 104. Coffee, supra note 86, at 5; see also 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 132.03 (3d ed. 1997) (“Issue Preclusion does not apply when the issues sought to be 
precluded in a subsequent proceeding were allegedly determined in a stipulation or a judgment by 
consent.”). 
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that respect, then, commentators’ concern with the new SEC admissions 
policy impermissibly extending liability through collateral estoppel is 
unfounded. Parklane is a distinguishable case for a settling party that has 
made an admission in a consent decree. 
Commentators are also concerned that a settling party’s admission 
would be admissible in evidence during the jury trial portion of future class 
actions. 105  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (“Compromise Offers and 
Negotiations”) addresses this particular concern.106 Rule 408 provides that 
evidence of the following is not admissible . . . : either to prove or 
disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a 
prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction . . . [including] conduct or a 
statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim — except 
when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a 
claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or 
enforcement authority.107 
By its own language, the Rule definitively bars statements made “during 
compromise” negotiations from being admitted into evidence in subsequent 
suits.108 Any admissions made in preliminary settlement talks with the SEC 
are therefore not admissible at a future trial.109 
The question remains, however, of whether Rule 408 allows for the 
admission into evidence of statements made in a party’s final settlement 
agreement.110 While no case has squarely decided this issue, there is case 
law that suggests even admissions made in a final settlement agreement 
would be inadmissible in subsequent trials.111 The courts have consistently 
interpreted Rule 408 as representing a general policy “that seeks to 
encourage dispute resolution by barring the admissibility of even completed 
settlement agreements.”112 Admissions are therefore likely to be excluded 
in future class actions because courts want to encourage parties to settle.113 
A contrary rule would disincentivize settlements and run counter to the 
established policy underlying Rule 408.114 
The exception provided for in Rule 408 also bears on the issue of 
whether an admission made in a settlement could be offered into evidence 
in future cases.115 That exception provides that an admission may not be 
entered into evidence except “when offered in a criminal case and the 
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negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its 
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”116 The plain language 
of this Rule applies to admissions obtained from a regulatory agency that 
federal prosecutors may subsequently enter into evidence in a parallel 
criminal case.117 This exception is notably silent on the issue of private 
class actions. Because of this statutory silence, defense attorneys can argue 
that the clear legislative intent behind Rule 408 is to allow the use of 
admissions in criminal cases only and to “preclude” their use in future civil 
actions. 118  In addition to the general policy encouraging settlements, 
defense attorneys can rely on this statutory language to exclude an 
admission from evidence at a subsequent trial. 
Though SEC settlement admissions may not damage parties at the trial 
stage of subsequent class actions, these admissions may have a significant 
effect on the cost of pre-trial proceedings for the settling parties.119 An 
admission in an SEC settlement may prove to be a highly effective weapon 
for shareholder plaintiffs in their pleadings and briefs because “courts have 
long shown a marked tendency not to dismiss class actions brought in the 
wake of SEC consent decrees, and the settlement amounts in those cases are 
typically higher.”120 The increased cost of these pre-trial proceedings is an 
accurate criticism of the Commission’s new policy but does not amount to 
the wholesale extension of collateral liability predicted by some 
commentators. 
B. INCREASE IN D&O INSURANCE COSTS 
The SEC’s admissions policy may also increase insurance costs for 
companies. Specifically, the new admissions policy may make it more 
expensive for a company to obtain and maintain Directors' and Officers' 
Liability Insurance (D&O).121 As a general matter, D&O protects directors 
and officers “from liability arising from actions connected to their corporate 
positions.”122 D&O may take many forms; the corporation could indemnify 
its directors and officers itself, or their liabilities may be covered by an 
outside insurance policy. 123  Parties are already prohibited from utilizing 
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their D&O to pay out penalties in settlements,124 so the new policy has no 
effect on that aspect of D&O coverage. The typical D&O policy does, 
however, require the insurer to pay attorneys’ fees for actions arising out of 
management’s corporate positions, including SEC enforcement actions.125 
Corporate defense fees in large-scale securities suits often amount to 
millions of dollars.126 The concern with the SEC’s new policy is that an 
insurer may be able to use a settlement admission as affirmative 
justification to preclude a settling party from recovering costs in accordance 
with its D&O policy.127 The denial of coverage for costs may also extend to 
subsequent private suits arising out of the same set of facts.128 
D&O policies typically contain a number of limiting provisions that 
preclude recovery on a policy if triggered.129 Conduct exclusions are one 
type of limiting provision included in almost all D&O policies.130 Conduct 
exclusions preclude coverage of directors and officers who have committed 
certain types of misconduct, including “loss relating to fraudulent or 
criminal misconduct and for loss relating to illegal profits or 
remuneration.”131 Importantly, however, most conduct exclusions include 
an “adjudication” triggering clause, requiring a final adjudication to find 
that the underlying conduct at issue has actually occurred in order for the 
exclusion to apply and for coverage to be barred.132 
In an SEC settlement where a party admits to wrongdoing, a D&O 
insurer may argue that the admitted behavior falls within the ambit of the 
conduct exclusion.133 Depending on the type of SEC action at issue, an 
insurer may also argue that an admission amounts to a final adjudication of 
the claim, triggering the conduct exclusion and barring the insured from 
collecting on their D&O coverage in suits arising out of the same set of 
facts.134 The possibility of triggering conduct exclusions with an admission 
contrasts with the SEC’s prior policy; “neither admit nor deny” language 
could not constitute an “adjudication” because such language does not 
imply that the underlying conduct at issue has occurred. 
That being said, the special nature of consent decrees is again relevant 
here. Consent decrees do “not . . . adjudicate” the underlying claims at 
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issue.135 They do not present a “full” and “fair” opportunity to litigate a 
dispute. 136  Instead, they represent “a compromise” between the 
Commission and the defending party.137 For these reasons, an insurer may 
not be able to successfully argue that an admission made in an SEC 
settlement triggers a conduct exclusion because a consent jugment is not an 
adjudication.  
The nature of the enforcement action at issue is also potentially 
significant. An admission in an administrative proceeding may be more 
desirable for an admitting party because these proceedings do not require 
court approval of the consent decree. 138 The admitting party in such an 
action can argue that conduct exclusions cannot be triggered by a non-
adjudicatory decree negotiated by the parties not subject to court 
approval.139 
Conduct exclusion provisions are typically followed by severability 
clauses providing that “acts or knowledge of one insured will not be 
imputed to any other insured for the purpose of applying the exclusion.”140 
The practical effect of this clause is that it bars coverage under the D&O 
policy only for those individuals whose actions or knowledge underlie the 
claim at issue. 141  Severability clauses related to exclusions are only 
triggered when the previously mentioned conduct exclusions are 
triggered.142 
Of most concern to settling parties are severability provisions related to 
applications for D&O coverage. 143  Importantly, these severability 
provisions “can be implicated even when the admissions do not rise to the 
level of triggering a conduct exclusion.”144 As part of the D&O application 
process, insurers often insist that the prospective insured make certain 
representations about particular facts in its initial application for D&O 
coverage.145 Depending on the language and representations contained in 
the particular policy at issue, an insurer may argue that an admission in an 
SEC settlement rescinds the D&O agreement because of the application’s 
severability provision. 146  If successful, the insured could lose D&O 
coverage in suits arising out of the same set of facts underlying the settled 
SEC claim.147  
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That being said, severability provisions in D&O policies are limited to 
the particular individuals making the representation in the application.148 
Well-drafted severability provisions of this type only preclude recovery if 
the individual that made the application admitted to wrongdoing in an SEC 
settlement.149 Insurers are therefore likely unable to preclude recovery on 
these grounds, provided the application agreement is sufficiently limited, as 
it likely is.150 
Insurers may also try to recoup funds they have already advanced to 
parties for their defense, under the theory that a particular admission 
triggers a conduct exclusion under the insurance policy.151 The same factors 
weighing against the triggering of conduct exclusions apply here. A number 
of other factors also weigh against an insurance company seeking 
recoupment, including the fact that by the time the insurer seeks to recover 
funds that they had advanced, it is likely that any individuals they hope to 
recover from will have few remaining assets. 152  Though efforts at 
recoupment by D&O insurers are relatively rare,153 attempted recoupment is 
a common enough occurrence that it may increase the scope of liability for 
a party making an admission under the SEC’s new settlement policy.154 
Recoupment is likely the only ground on which an insurer may claw back 
money provided for costs because of an admission made in an SEC 
settlement.155 
III. LIMITING LIABILITY IN ADMISSIONS OF WRONGDOING 
The actual implementation of the SEC’s new admissions policy has not 
proven as catastrophic as some of its opponents have predicted. In the cases 
where an admission has been made, the admission has been structured in 
such a manner that it limits the settling party's future liability. 156  This 
development anticipates and ameliorates corporate defense attorneys’ 
concerns with the new policy. Mr. Karp, a corporate defense attorney, has 
said that defendants in SEC enforcement actions will “try to find every way 
possible to avoid” collateral liability from an admission.157 That being said, 
he also predicted that “if they can negotiate around it, there will be early 
settlements.”158 Mr. Karp’s words have proven prophetic, at least in regards 
to the admissions so far obtained. Both the Harbinger and JPMorgan 
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admissions are carefully tailored to avoid any further collateral liability for 
the settling parties.159 An in-depth examination of both of these cases is 
instructive in this regard. 
Harbinger and Mr. Falcone admit to the misconduct the SEC alleged in 
their enforcement action in Appendix A of the consent decree. 160 
Harbinger’s admission of wrongdoing contains specific language forbidding 
the defendants from denying any of the factual representations contained in 
their admission. 161  Such language accords with prior SEC practice. 162 
Specifically, Harbinger is bound not to “take any action or make or permit 
to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any 
allegation in the complaints or creating the impression that the complaints 
are without factual basis.” 163  In short, Mr. Falcone is prohibited from 
denying the admission of wrongdoing contained in the settlement.  
The very same paragraph, however, contains important language that 
limits Harbinger’s liability in future suits arising under the same set of 
facts. 164  The consent decree provides that the Harbinger defendants’ 
admission in no way affects their “right to take legal or factual positions in 
litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a 
party.”165 This language signifies that Harbinger’s admission in the SEC 
enforcement action will not collaterally estop it from contesting its liability 
on the same issues in an action with a third party, including Harbinger’s 
D&O insurance provider. 
Mr. Falcone has not escaped completely unscathed from his admission. 
Relying on the admission made in his settlement with the SEC, a New York 
regulator recently punished Mr. Falcone in an unrelated case. 166  The 
regulator, Benjamin M. Lawsky, banned Mr. Falcone from controlling 
insurance companies in the state of New York for seven years. 167  This 
collateral consequence is important because Harbinger owns Fidelity and 
Guaranty Life Insurance.168 The effect of the ban is that Mr. Falcone is 
unable to serve as an officer or director of the subsidiary insurer.169 The 
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basis of the ban was an expansive New York law allowing regulators to 
prevent an individual from overseeing insurance companies if they are 
“untrustworthy.” 170  Mr. Lawsky used Mr. Falcone’s admission in the 
Harbinger settlement to establish him as an “untrustworthy” individual and 
effect the ban.171 Given the limited nature of this collateral consequence,172 
it remains to be seen if this will deter future parties from making an 
admission in a settlement with the Commission. 
Similar to Harbinger’s settlement, JPMorgan’s admission of liability 
also proscribes future liability. 173  JPMorgan admits to the misconduct 
detailed in Annex A of the consent decree. 174  The decree, however, 
expressly provides that “the findings herein . . . are not binding on any other 
person or entity in this or any other proceeding.”175 Like the Harbinger 
consent decree, the express terms of JPMorgan’s admission do not 
collaterally estop it from contesting the same issues in suits arising out of 
the same set of facts. Furthermore, JPMorgan structured its admission in 
such a manner that it admitted to a failure of internal risk controls, not to 
fraud. 176  Fraud is usually a prerequisite for private suits brought by 
shareholders. 177  Even if a court were to disregard the expressly limited 
nature of JPMorgan’s consent decree,178 the bank’s admission to inadequate 
risk controls would not establish liability in a future plaintiff shareholder 
suit.179 The ability of counsel in future cases to structure settlements along 
these lines will curtail settling parties’ collateral liability and incentivize 
more admissions. 
It’s important to note that the SEC pursued different enforcement 
actions in these two cases. Harbinger’s settlement resulted from an 
enforcement action before a federal district judge. 180  JPMorgan’s, in 
contrast, was an administrative proceeding before one of the SEC’s 
administrative law judges.181 For a variety of reasons, collateral liability 
resulting from admissions made in a consent decree is circumscribed in 
both types of actions. Administrative proceedings may offer even more 
favorable conditions to settling parties, though, because these proceedings 
do not require court approval. 182 An administrative proceeding therefore 
constitutes even less of a “fair” and “full” opportunity to litigate a dispute.  
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If viewed in a cynical light, the aforementioned settlements could be 
interpreted as a failure of the SEC’s new policy. The settling parties’ 
liability in future suits is carefully circumscribed by the very terms of the 
consent judgments. If the Commission's stated purpose of accountability is 
kept in mind, however, it is clear that the SEC effected this goal in both 
cases. There now exists “an unambiguous record of the conduct” at issue in 
both of these cases.183 Contrast that positive factual record with the result 
that would have occurred under the previous “neither admit nor deny” 
policy, where a party would settle without ever specifying the conduct at 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Criticism of the SEC’s new admissions policy for increasing a settling 
party's liability is misplaced. No doubt, the Commission has more effective 
weapons in its enforcement arsenal than extending settling parties’ 
collateral liability in suits with third parties and driving up insurance costs. 
More importantly, such criticisms miss the point of the new policy. Chair 
White’s stated purpose in seeking admissions in certain cases is to increase 
public accountability,184 a particularly relevant concern in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. In seeking admissions in certain cases, the SEC is 
pursuing accountability and transparency through the creation of an 
unambiguous factual record of the conduct at issue.185 In pursuing this goal, 
the SEC has allowed parties to structure their admissions in such a way that 
they expressly limit future liability, provided the parties admit to the 
conduct at issue for the purposes of the enforcement action. This 
demonstrated willingness on the part of the SEC to compromise with 
settling parties will no doubt be a decisive factor moving forward in 
extracting future admissions.  
Furthermore, the SEC’s new policy does not in fact increase settling 
parties’ collateral liability. This is in large part due to the special nature of 
consent decrees. These decrees are non-adjudicatory because they represent 
a negotiated compromise between the parties. The non-adjudicatory nature 
of a consent decree does not present a full and fair opportunity to litigate an 
issue, and therefore offensive collateral estoppel is not available to 
shareholder plaintiffs on the basis of an admission.186 A consent decree 
admission would likely be excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
from a jury trial for similar reasons.187 Furthermore, an admission would 
likely not preclude a corporation from collecting on its D&O.188 Even if the 
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SEC in the future is unwilling to accept a hedged admission by a settling 
party, then the special nature of consent judgments limits any resulting 
collateral liability to third parties.  
Taken together, the SEC’s willingness to negotiate with parties and the 
limited nature of the collateral liability resulting from consent judgments 
signify that the criticisms leveled against the Commission’s new admissions 
policy are overstated.  
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